I consider the elicitation of ambiguous beliefs about an event. I introduce a mechanism that allows to identify an interval of probabilities (representing ambiguity perception) for several classes of ambiguity averse preferences. The agent reveals her preference for mixing binarized bets on the uncertain event and its complement under varying betting odds. Under ambiguity aversion, mixing is informative about the interval of beliefs. In particular, the mechanism allows to distinguish ambiguous beliefs from point beliefs, and identifies the belief interval for maxmin preferences. For ambiguity averse smooth second order and variational preferences, the mechanism reveals inner bounds for the belief interval, which are sharp under additional assumptions.
Introduction
Most economic modeling is based on subjective expected utility (SEU) (Savage, 1954) . However, uncertainty often cannot be represented by a precise probability measure. Instead, the perception of uncertainty is ambiguous (Knight, 1921) . Initiated by Ellsberg (1961) , various experiments show that such ambiguity matters for decision making. (For surveys on ambiguity sensitive decision models see Etner et al., 2012; Machina and Siniscalchi, 2014; Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015) .
While there exist many experimental studies with artificially generated ambiguity, the application of ambiguity sensitive models in empirical studies is difficult without means to measure ambiguity perception.
Illustration: A simple mixing bet
In this paper, I propose a simple mechanism that is informative about the ambiguity of a natural event E. In its simplest form, the elementary building block of the mechanism is the choice between [E q ] a lottery that pays with probability q if the event E realizes (betting on E), [C q ] a lottery that pays with probability 1 − q if the the event E does not realize (betting on the complement of E), and
[M q ] a lottery that pays with probability q(1 − q).
The choice [M q ] can be interpreted as probabilistic mixture of option [E q ] and option [C q ] that is independent of the potentially ambiguous event E. The value associated with each of the choices depends on q and is illustrated in Figure 1 . If the decision maker acts like an expected utility maximizing agent, the value of [E q ] and [C q ] is linear in q. Further, the decision maker is indifferent between the mixture [M q ] and its elements [E q ] and [C q ] if those have equal value. The best response is the choice [E q ] for large q and [C q ] for large 1 − q. There exists no q such that the choice [M q ] is the unique best response. The value 1 − q at which the decision maker switches between the choice [E q ] and [C q ] can be used to elicit the subjective probability p.
The same holds true for probabilistically sophisticated preferences (Machina and Schmeidler, 1992) , where each choice is associated with a probability of payout that is transformed with a monotone value function. The difference in value between the three choices are subject to a monotone transformation, and the best response remains unaffected.
Under ambiguity aversion, the value of the choice [M q ] remains unchanged, the ambiguous choices [E q ] and [C q ], however, are less attractive. Thus, the choice [M q ] is the best response for some interval M of values 1 − q. For ambiguity averse preferences, the interval M at which the decision maker prefers [M q ] is related to ambiguity perception and ambiguity The left plot illustrates the utility functional under SEU, the middle plot under probabilistically sophisticated preferences, and the right plot under ambiguity averse preferences. The choice [E q ] is preferred for large q, the choice [C q ] for small q. In this example, the subjective probability is p = 0.3, and the probabilistically sophisticated values are based on a probability weighting function w(p) = exp(−(− ln(p)) 3/4 ) (compare Prelec, 1998 attitude. In particular, the set M contains the probability p associated with ambiguity neutral preferences. Further, the set M is larger for more ambiguity averse preferences. Without additional structure, ambiguity aversion cannot be separated into ambiguity attitude and perception. In the following, I define and identify ambiguity perception in the form of an interval of beliefs for specific classes of ambiguity averse preferences.
Separation of ambiguity perception: The belief interval
To understand the empirical content of decision models, it is crucial to separate perception and attitude (Manski, 2004) . Let us consider the task of identifying the set of probabilities that potentially influence an agent's decision. I call the range of probabilities that are necessary to describe the agents behavior the belief interval. Preferences are said to exhibit ambiguous beliefs if the belief interval is not a single point. The following representations for preferences over acts l that depend on an uncertain event E allow to define a belief interval. The classical subjective expected utility (SEU) by Savage (1954) can be represented with a single probability p in the unit interval and a utility function u by
The non-ambiguous beliefs for SEU preferences reduce to a single point p. Other models require ambiguous beliefs for their representation. Maxmin expected utility (maxmin) by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is represented with a belief interval B = [a, b] by
The more general variational preferences by Maccheroni et al. (2006) can be represented with a positive cost function c by
In second order decision models, ambiguity aversion is defined as aversion to uncertainty on the expected utility. Such ambiguity averse second order smooth preferences by Klibanoff et al. (2005) can be represented with a probability measure P on the unit interval and a concave second order utility function φ by
For second order preferences the belief interval B is the support of the probability measure P. Other ambiguity averse preferences, e.g. biseparable preferences (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2001 ) that include α-maxmin (Ghirardato et al., 2004; Marinacci, 2002) and Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler, 1989) , do not allow for a similarly separation of a belief interval from ambiguity attitude.
For elicitation of the belief interval, consider the following mechanism that contains the prospects [E q ], [C q ], and [M q ] from Section 1.1 as special cases. The agent is endowed with lottery tickets, where each ticket represents a fixed probability to win a prize (e.g., a monetary reward). The agent has to bet each ticket on the event or its complement. If the event realizes, the agent obtains the tickets placed on the event multiplied by the odds of the event. Otherwise, she obtains the tickets placed on the complement multiplied by the odds of the complement. This task is called a mixing bet and it is repeated with different odds, where one instance was randomly selected for payout.
The lottery tickets guarantee robustness with respect to the unknown utility function (Smith, 1961) , if one is willing to assume that the randomization device is perceived as independent and objective lottery. Paying out only one mixing bet with specific odds is meant to prevent hedging across the repeated betting tasks (see Azrieli et al., 2018; Bade, 2015 , for discussions on validity and further references). If the normalized odds are above the belief interval, the best response is to bet all tickets on the event. Reversed, if the normalized odds are below, the best response is to bet all tickets on the complement. Under the ambiguity averse preferences considered above, mixing (betting tickets on the event and the complement) is a sufficient condition for the normalized odds being in the belief interval. Beliefs are ambiguous (i.e., they do not reduce to a single probability level) if and only if the agent mixes for at least two different odds. Thus, ambiguous beliefs can be identified by eliciting mixing behavior for different betting odds.
As the interval of mixing odds lies within the belief interval, the belief interval can be bounded from within. For maxmin preferences, the bounds are sharp. Under second order and variational preferences with sufficiently strong ambiguity aversion, the mixing interval recovers the belief interval, if the utility difference between prizes is sufficiently large.
Related literature
The contribution of this paper is the introduction of an implementable mechanism to elicit ambiguity perception under a wide range of ambiguity averse preferences. Related work obtains more powerful identification results (including under ambiguity seeking preferences) at the expense of generality across decision models or simplicity of the mechanism. Bose and Daripa (2017a) extend the mechanism introduced by Karni (2009) to α-maxmin preferences. In another paper Bose and Daripa (2017b) introduce a mechanism that identifies the distribution of beliefs for second order preferences. Baillon et al. (2018) propose indices of ambiguity attitude and perception based on matching probabilities (Dimmock et al., 2015) for three mutually exclusive events and their pairwise unions. Baillon et al. (2019) show that their index is insightful under a wide range of ambiguity sensitive models. However, their index of ambiguity perception is not applicable for binary events. Li et al. (2018) apply the method in a trust game.
Other work focuses on the revelation of dynamic information structures. Chambers and Lambert (2018) discuss the truth-telling mechanisms for dynamic elicitation of subjective probabilities of a potentially information receiving agent. Karni (2017) provides elicitation of subjective probabilities on the set of of arising posteriors in the dynamic context, which is also applicable for the ambiguity model introduced in Karni and Safra (2016) . Karni (2018) applies a similar approach for graded preferences (Minardi and Savochkin, 2015) .
So far, applied studies considering uncertainty rely mostly on proxies for ambiguity. Brenner and Izhakian (2018) use the marginal distribution of intra day data, Anderson et al. (2009) the disagreement between professional forecasters, and Rossi et al. (2017) the deviation between probabilistic forecast and realization. Gallant et al. (2018) employ a Bayesian approach in a structural model that features inter-temporal second order preferences (Klibanoff et al., 2009) .
In the next section, the key findings of the paper are summarized. For technical details see Section 3, where the mixing behavior under different preferences is derived. Sections 3.1 to 3.3 cover maxmin, second order, and variational preferences respectively. Section 4 concludes. The appendix discusses biseparable preferences, the elicitation of ambiguity attitude for α-maxmin preferences, and the elicitation of ambiguous beliefs over real-valued variables.
Mixing bets and the belief interval
Consider the task of eliciting beliefs about an event E from an agent with unknown preferences. The state space is given by S = {E, E c } × [0, 1], where any state s ∈ S describes the realization of the event E and the independent random draw r of the elicitation mechanism. The agent's preferences are defined on acts l : S → X that assign an outcome to each state. The set of all acts is denoted by F.
Throughout the paper, some kind of aversion to ambiguity is assumed within one of several ambiguity sensitive preferences.
Regularity Conditions 1 (ambiguity aversion). The agent has ambiguity averse smooth second order or variational preferences, where the random draw r is independent from E and uniformly distributed.
Essentially, Regularity Conditions 1 imply expected utility for the lottery (risk) and ambiguity aversion for acts that depend on the event E. Regularity Conditions 1 contain maxmin preferences as a special case. Note that the assumption on the random draw r has to be formulated differently depending on the preference class at hand. Similarly, the exact definition of ambiguity aversion depends on the class of preferences. For details see Regularity Conditions 3 for maxmin, Regularity Conditions 4 for variational, and Regularity Conditions 5 for second order preferences.
The belief interval is defined as the range of relevant probabilities.
Definition 1 (belief interval). The belief interval B is defined as the smallest closed interval that contains all relevant probability levels for a representation of the preferences.
Heuristically, the belief interval B denotes the relevant probabilities p that the agent considers when making decisions related to the uncertain event E. Section 3 provides details on the uniqueness of the belief interval. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) formulates a general representation of a wide range of ambiguity averse preferences with Klibanoff et al. (2014) provide a behavioral definition of relevant probabilities in smooth models that coincides with the belief interval for maxmin and second order preferences.
For SEU preferences, the belief interval B = {p} is unique. Ambiguity averse preferences, however, take into account a range of probability levels.
Definition 2 (ambiguous beliefs). Preferences are said to exhibit ambiguous beliefs about the event E if the belief interval B is not a single point.
The elementary building block of the elicitation mechanism can be described as follows.
1. The agent chooses the ratio x of lottery tickets that she bets on the event E (and the remainder 1 − x on its complement E c ).
2. If the event E realizes, the agent receives xq lottery tickets. If the event E c realizes, the agent receives (1 − x)(1 − q) lottery tickets. 
The two potential outcomes of this mixing bet are w and 0. Throughout, it is assumed that the agent prefers to obtain the prize w. The mixing interval M describes all odds for which the agent is mixing between the the event and the complement.
Trivially, the optimal mixing ratio is x = 1 (betting all lottery tickets on E), if the quota q is large enough. The resulting act is [E q ], a lottery with probability q if the event realizes. Similarly, the optimal mixing is x = 0 (betting all lottery tickets on E c ), if the quota q is small enough. The resulting act is [C q ], a lottery with probability 1 − q if the complement realizes. Both acts depend on the potentially ambiguous event E. If the agent bets 1 − q on the event, the resulting act is [M q ], a lottery with probability q(1 − q) irrespective of the uncertain event E. The ambiguity cancels out. An ambiguity averse agent prefers to mix between the two events to hedge against ambiguity. The higher the ambiguity aversion, the stronger is the optimal mixing drawn towards 1 − q. The main result of the paper establishes that such mixing implies ambiguous probabilities.
Theorem 1 (belief interval). Under Regularity Condition 1 mixing for a quota q implies that 1 − q is an element of the belief interval.

M ⊂ B.
In particular, if an agent mixes for two different quotas the agent holds ambiguous beliefs.
Theorem 1 is established in Section 3 for each class of preferences separately. This result allows to bound the belief interval from within. The set of values of 1 − q for which the agent chooses [M q ] is a subset of the mixing interval M . Thus, the simple choice from Section 1.1 is sufficient to bound the belief interval. However, the mixing interval M provides sharper bounds for the belief interval. Figure 2 illustrates how observed choices for different odds provide information about the beliefs. In this example, the agent holds ambiguous beliefs, as she is mixing for multiple odds. Further, the position of the interval is consistent with high probabilities for the event E ranging at least from 0.6 to 0.8.
Small mixing intervals can only be detected if appropriate odds are applied. For ambiguous beliefs such odds always exist.
Theorem 2 (ambiguous beliefs). Under Regularity Conditions 1, beliefs are ambiguous if and only if there exist at least two separate odds q for which the agent prefers to mix.
The identification result for the belief interval B can be strengthened further. Additional considerations allow to separate the belief interval (ambiguity perception) from the ambiguity attitude. Under maxmin preferences, it holds that
For variational preferences, an unbounded utility difference u ∆ and a bounded first derivative of the cost function c establish that there exists a utility difference u ∆ such that
See Section 3.2 for details.
For second order preferences, a uniformly positive ambiguity aversion guarantees that the mixing interval M u ∆ approximately covers the belief interval B for a sufficiently large
See Section 3.3 for details.
Optimal mixing
First, consider the best response to the betting mechanism for an agent with SEU preferences.
Regularity Conditions 2 (SEU).
The agent has SEU preferences with a belief p ∈ [0, 1] about the event E. In particular, the preferences can be represented by
for some strictly increasing utility function u.
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the agent holds accurate beliefs about the independent uniform draw that is used in the mechanism to induce risk neutrality. Hence, fully accurate the representation above is
For notational convenience, the distribution of r is not stated explicitly. The best response under SEU is x (q) = arg max
where r ∼ U [0, 1] is independent of E and
In a first step, the analysis can be simplified with a key result from binarized scoring rules (compare e.g., Hossain and Okui, 2013) .
Lemma 1 (binarized score). For any score s in the unit interval, the expected utility of a lottery payout based on the score s is a positive affine transformation of the expected score
Proof of Lemma 1. The expected utility can be expressed as a linear function of the probability of winning,
Further, from the independent uniform distribution of r and as s ∈ [0, 1] it follows that Under Lemma 1 the optimal mixing behaviour for SEU preferences is independent of the agent's utility function.
Lemma 2 (SEU). The optimal mixing under SEU preferences (denoted under Regularity Conditions 2) is
The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward as the maximization problem can be rewritten with Lemma 1 as x * (q) = arg max
which is linear in x. Mixing bets is optimal if and only if 1 − q equals the subjective probability p. Otherwise, betting all lottery tickets on one event is optimal. If the elicitor observes x(q) * = 1, it follows that p > 1 − q. For x(q) * = 0, it follows that p < 1 − q. Thus, observing betting choices for different odds q, it is possible to identify the belief p.
The remainder of this section considers the best response to the betting mechanism for more general decision models.
Maxmin preferences
This section establishes the optimal mixing for maxmin preferences. First, consider an agent with maxmin preferences and an belief interval B. The shaded area marks the belief interval, which is identified by the mixing behavior.
Regularity Conditions 3 (maxmin). The agent holds maxmin preferences with belief interval B = [a, b] about the event E. In particular, the preferences can be represented by
The set of measures B is unique and the belief interval is well-defined. As a special case, maxmin preferences contain SEU preferences if the beliefs are unambiguous with B = {p}.
Lemma 3 (maxmin). The optimal answer for maxmin preferences as in Regularity Conditions 3 is
Lemma 3 follows from the more general statement for variational preferences in Lemma Lemma 4. See Lemma 6 in the Appendix for α-maxmin preferences.
Interpreting betting behavior for maxmin preferences is straightforward. If everything is betted on the complement E c , the belief interval B is below 1 − q. If everything is betted on E, the belief interval is above 1 − q. Finally, if mixing is observed, the belief interval contains 1 − q.
Variational preferences
This section establishes the mixing behavior under variational preferences (Maccheroni et al., 2006) , which generalize multiplier preferences (Hansen, 2007; Hansen and Sargent, 2007) . We assume variational preferences with belief interval B.
Regularity Conditions 4 (variational preferences). The agent has variational preferences.
In particular, the preferences over acts l(E) can be represented by
for some strictly increasing utility function u and some grounded, strictly convex and twice continuously differentiable cost function c : B → R. 
for a continuous function m w and it holds that
If c is bounded and u ∆ is unbounded there exists a prize w such that the mixing interval identifies the belief interval,
Proof of Lemma 4. We apply Lemma 1 and obtain the simplified optimization problem
The decision maker acts as if more ambiguity averse for higher utility difference between prizes u ∆ = u(w) − u(0) (Proposition 8, Maccheroni et al., 2006) . Define c t (p) = c(p)/u ∆ for notational convenience. c t is also grounded, strictly convex and twice continuously differentiable. Examine the minimum of
The function g is convex. For fixed x, the minimum at p * is characterized by the first order condition g (p * (x)) = x−(1−q)+c t (p * (x)) = 0. It holds that c is increasing by the convexity assumption and it follows that p * (x) is decreasing in x.
• First case:
The agent values the resulting bets as a function of x by
Thus, x = 1 if 1 − q < a. For 1 − q > a, consider the following two sub-cases:
-If c t (a) < 0, it follows that x * = min(1, 1 − q − c t (a)).
-If c t (a) > 0, it follows that x * = max(0, 1 − q − c t (a)).
• Second case: p
Thus, x = 0 if 1 − q > b. For 1 − q < b, consider the following two sub-cases:
• Third case:
= min
The first order condition is
And describes a maximum as U (x) > 0 ⇐⇒ p * (x) > 1 − q and p * (x) decreasing in x. Thus, it follows that
For any point 1 − q, mixing is optimal if
which holds true for a sufficiently large u ∆ if c is bounded.
Smooth second order preferences
This section considers the outcome dependent smooth second order preferences (compare Ergin and Gul, 2009; Klibanoff et al., 2005; Nau, 2006; Seo, 2009 ).
Regularity Conditions 5. The agent holds beliefs P in form of a distribution over [0, 1] with support B = [a, b] with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 about the event E and has ambiguity averse smooth second order preferences. In particular, the preferences over acts l(E) can be represented by
for some strictly increasing utility function u and some strictly increasing, concave, and twice continuously differentiable second order utility function φ.
The agent acts like a SEU type for linear φ functions. The second order probabilities P are almost surely unique and the belief interval is unique across representations. See Klibanoff et al. (2014) for a theoretical discussion on capturing the perception of ambiguity under second order preferences and beyond.
Lemma 5. The optimal mixing for a mixing bet with prize w of an ambiguity averse agent with second order preferences as in Regularity Conditions 5 is
for some increasing and continuous function m w (·) such that for all w
In particular it holds for the mixing interval that
is bounded away from zero, it holds that
The continuity of m implies that the agent is mixing on an interval with positive length. For sufficiently strong ambiguity aversion second order preferences are essentially identical to maxmin preferences (Klibanoff et al., 2005 , Proposition 3) and the belief interval can be identified with a high degree of accuracy. Lemma 5 shows that the same effect can be generated by increasing the utility difference u ∆ = u(w) − u(0) if one is willing to assume strictly positive ambiguity aversion.
In Figure 6 three examples with different constant absolute ambiguity aversion are shown. The example illustrates that the bounds on the belief interval are conservative for moderate rates of ambiguity aversion.
Proof of Lemma 5. For notational convenience define s
with φ t (z) = φ(u ∆ z + u 0 ) increasing and concave and
First, consider the case 1 − q ≤ a. As p ≤ 1 − q implies φ t is increasing in x, this case implies that φ t is P-almost surely increasing in x. Thus, E p∼P [ φ t (s q (x, p)) ] increasing in x and x * = 1. A similar argument shows x * = 0 for 1 − q ≥ b. The remainder of the proof considers the case
As φ t is continuously differentiable, φ t and its first two derivatives are integrable on B, it follows by the dominant convergence theorem that
2 ], which in turn implies that U (x, q) is concave in x as φ t ≤ 0. We conclude that for fixed q the optimal mixing x * (q) is unique. Further, by the maximum theorem (Ok, 2007) x (q) is continuous as it holds that U (x, q) is continuous by the dominated convergence theorem. If a = b the following argument shows that mixing is optimal for an interval that contains 1 − E p∼P [p] . Consider the first order condition
As φ t concave, the derivative φ t is decreasing and it follows that φ t (pq) ≤ φ t (bq) almost surely. Thus, [p] . Analogously, it can be followed that the FOC for x = 0 is positive if 1 − q < E E∼p [p] . As x * (1 − q) is continuous on the belief interval B, it follows that mixing is optimal in an environment of E E∼p [p] if B doesn't reduce to a single point. Now consider a series w n such that u ∆,n = u(w n ) − u(0) → ∞. The utility function is not unique (compare Theorem 1 Klibanoff et al., 2005) . If preferences are represented by utility functions u n (0) = 0 and u n (w n ) = 1, the agent acts identical to a decision maker with transformed φ n (z) = φ( z u ∆,n + c 0 ). The coefficient of ambiguity aversion for this rescaled agent is
where
is uniquely defined coefficient of ambiguity aversion. It holds that α n+1 > α n . If α(z) is bounded away from zero, it holds that inf z α n (z) → ∞. With Proposition 4 in Klibanoff et al. (2005) it follows that for large n the preferences are essentially identical to maxmin preferences. Lemma 3 establishes that those have mixing interval M = B.
Discussion
The separation of persistent attitudes and temporary perception is a potentially insightful endeavor. Mixing bets can be used to elicit belief intervals and subsequently analyze their impact on decision making as well as their development under changing information environments. Conveniently, the mechanism can be used within a whole range of ambiguity averse attitudes. For ambiguity seeking preferences, however, mixing bets are uninformative about the length of the belief interval.
Elicitation of subjective probabilities is often done by matching probabilities (e.g., Holt, 2007) also called choice-based probabilities (Abdellaoui et al., 2011) . In this approach, the probability of an event E is defined by the point of indifference between a lottery that pays a winning prize with probability p and a lottery that pays the same prize if E realizes. As already pointed out in Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti (1931) another obvious measure of belief is through betting. Preceding ambiguity sensitive decision models in economics, Smith (1961) proposes to define subjective probabilities by the interval of odds that an agent agrees to bet on a certain event. By allowing the agent to mix bets, I extend Smith's hypothetical design and establish that multiple mixing identifies ambiguity.
There are two different ways to elicit ambiguous beliefs. One can ask directly for ranges of probabilities (e.g., Giustinelli and Pavoni, 2017; Manski and Molinari, 2010) or rely on observed decisions as proposed here. Data obtained by observed decisions, that involve monetary consequences, are often deemed more credible than verbal statements. In this paper, I follow this line of reasoning and advocate an indirect elicitation mechanism that infers per se unobservable entities (in this case the belief interval) from observed choices instead of explicit verbal statements. Ambiguity averse decision models describe behavior, rather than thought processes. The belief interval may well have considerable explanatory and predictive power regarding an agents behavior, while the agent is unable to explicitly articulate such an interval.
The introduced mixing bets have a direct connection to proper scoring rules and can be seen as an application of multiple point forecasting as introduced in Eyting and Schmidt (2018) to binary events. The betting mechanism can be restated as binarized asymmetric piecewise linear score for a point forecast of the random variable 1(E). The best response is a quantile of the underlying distribution, where the level of the quantile depends on the odds quota (compare e.g. Gneiting, 2011). As pointed out in Chambers (2008) , the best response to proper scoring rules under maxmin preferences is equal to the best response to one element of the set of probabilities. This finding extends to mixing bets, where the quantile is 1 for large and 0 for small quantile levels for all probabilities in the belief interval.
A major concern is whether the agent acts differently if multiple odds are elicited and one is randomly selected for payout instead of just one choice being elicited. The validity of this random lottery procedure has been shown to falter for simple choices (Starmer and Sugden, 1991) . In the ambiguity averse context, an additional concern is how the agent reacts when faced with multiple bets on the same uncertain outcome. The application of our results require the agent to apply the ambiguity aversion on each bet separately instead of hedging across bets. This point, however, arises necessarily in the elicitation with random devices for ambiguous averse agents (compare Bade, 2015) and similarly arises for other elicitation mechanisms (e.g., Baillon et al., 2018; Bose and Daripa, 2017a) .
Another concern is that the validity of the mechanism depends on the existence of a randomization device for the lottery payout that is perceived as risk without ambiguity. Similar issues arise for mechanisms that elicit matching probabilities (Baillon et al., 2018) or that employ objective lotteries (Bose and Daripa, 2017a,b) .
The belief interval is interpreted as the set of relevant probability measures. This interpretation is not appropriate for preferences that do not allow to uniquely define such a set of measures. For general preference classes, a separation of ambiguity perception and ambiguity attitude is infeasible (for further references see Ghirardato and Siniscalchi, 2012; Klibanoff et al., 2014; Siniscalchi, 2006) . Nevertheless, mixing bets are informative about ambiguity perception under such preferences.
A.1 maxmin preferences
Consider α-maxmin preferences with prior probabilities C.
Regularity Conditions 6 (α-maxmin). The agent holds ambiguity averse α-maxmin preferences with priors
In particular, the preferences can be represented by
for some α > 0.5 and a strictly increasing utility function u.
The set of priors C is generally not unique (Siniscalchi, 2006) . To avoid confusion with the belief interval B, which reflects ambiguity perception that is independent of the representation of the preferences, the set of priors is denoted by C.
Lemma 6 (α-maxmin). The optimal mixing for α-maxmin preferences as in Regularity Conditions 6 is
Proof of Lemma 6. We apply Lemma 1 and obtain the simplified optimization problem
The solution is independent of affine transformations to the expected utility and therefore independent of the utility difference in prizes u ∆ = u(w) − u(0). The agent values the resulting bets as a function of x by
(1 − α)
Effectively, the agent assumes αb = αb + (1 − α)a if she bets little on E and αa = αa + (1 − α)b if she bets heavily on E. The two cases can easily be solved.
• First case (x < 1 − q):
The value for the agent is
which implies the optimal mixing
• Second case (x ≥ 1 − q):
The value for the agent is U (x) = 1 − x − q + xq + αa(x − (1 − q)) = x(q − (1 − αa)) + 1 − q − αa + αaq, which implies the optimal mixing
From Lemma 6, we deduce that an α-maxmin agent mixes on a smaller interval than a maxmin agent. If we wrongly assumed that α = 1, the length of the prior interval would be underestimated. To identify the prior set C, it is necessary to elicit the individual ambiguity aversion quantified by the parameter α. Several approaches are known in the literature. Sutter et al. (2013) use choice lists to bound the certainty equivalence of Ellsberg-type urns. Dimmock et al. (2016) elicit choices between Ellsberg-type urns and urns with known probabilities.
Under the assumption that the experimentally generated ambiguity is perceived as planned, mixing bets on artificial ambiguous events can be used to elicit ambiguity aversion for α-maxmin preferences. Given such a artificially generated ambiguous event E A with unknown ) can be identified if an additional risky event is considered. We generate two artificial events: The fixed event E f has a binomial distribution with fixed probability f and the ambiguous event E A has a binomial distribution with unknown probability p ∈ [0, 1]. The agent can bet on E f and E A with quota q and 1 − q. Let x denote the amount of acts put on the fixed event E f .
Lemma 7.
If the agent's preferences for acts over E f and E A can be represented by α-maxmin preferences with prior set P = f × [0, 1], the optimal mixing is
where the switching point is s(f, α) = f /(f + 1 − α).
Proof of Lemma 7. By Lemma 1 the agent maximizes
Trivially, the evaluation is linear in x and the optimal mixing is x
. It follows that the switching point is s(f, α) = f /(f + 1 − α).
Eliciting the mixing preferences for various quotas q bounds the switching point s(f, α), which in turn provides bounds on α. Figure 7 illustrates how the switching point depends on α if the probability of the fixed probability event is set to 1. In this case, the agent chooses between betting on the ambiguous event or keeping the lottery tickets. Subsequently, the prior interval can be computed based on the elicited
Importantly, the elicited α is only useful for identifying the prior interval for natural events under the assumption that α is constant across the two domains and that the induced priors of the agent about the ambiguous event are indeed representable by the unit interval [0, 1] . Note that the prior interval is an insightful concept if we are willing to assume that the agent acts as if following one of the discussed preferences. The elicitation of ambiguity attitude assumes additionally that a specific ambiguity perception (in the case of α-maxmin preferences a specific prior interval) can be induced. See Halevy (2007) and Abdellaoui et al. (2015) for experimental evidence on different evaluations between compound lotteries and ambiguous prospects.
A.2 Choquet expected utility (CEU) and biseparable preferences
This section covers biseparable preferences and as a special case CEU preferences.
First, let us consider biseparable preferences over lotteries in an Anscombe-Aumann framework. Let [p] denote the objective lottery that pays out w with probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p. Let xEy denote the act that pays lottery x if E realizes and lottery y otherwise. Then, the mixing bet with prize w, quote q and response x can be described as 
Regularity Conditions 7 (biseparable over lotteries
Biseparable preferences over lotteries assume expected utility for the lotteries. In line with Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) an event is perceived as ambiguous if
Lemma 8 (biseparable over lotteries). The optimal mixing for biseparable preferences as in Regularity Conditions 7 is
Lemma 9 (biseparable). The optimal mixing for biseparable preferences as in Regularity Conditions 8 is
Proof of Lemma 9. If x > 1 − q, it holds that xq > xq + 1 − q − x and
The utility functional is
and thus linear in
and thus linear in x. If 1−v(E c ) > 1−q the optimal mixing is x * (q) = 1−q. If 1−p(E c ) < 1−q the optimal mixing is x * (q) = 0.
Biseparable preferences determine the representation on binary acts only. While this is sufficient to compute optimal mixing, an interpretation of the mixing interval as relevant measures is not appropriate. Consider α-maxmin as example, which are also biseparable preferences (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2001) , that potentially have a larger prior set C than [v(E), 1 − v(E c )]. For ambiguity averse CEU preferences, the mixing interval identifies the core of the capacity.
Regularity Conditions 9 (CEU). The agent holds ambiguity averse CEU preferences with a capacity as in Regularity Conditions 8.
By Lemma 9, for CEU preferences the mixing interval is identical to the marginal core [v(E), 1 − v(E c )]. As ambiguity averse CEU preferences are a special case of maxmin preferences, where the core of the CEU preferences constitutes the set of priors for maxmin preferences (Schmeidler, 1989) , this result also follows from Lemma 3. Note that Klibanoff (2001) establishes that the existence of an independent randomization device implies a nonconvexity of the capacity in CEU. for some strictly increasing utility function u : X → R and some quasi convex G that is increasing in its first argument and min p∈B G(t, p) = t.
A.3 General ambiguity averse preferences
Under continuity and unboundedness (compare assumption A.5 and A.6 in Cerreia- Vioglio et al., 2011) , the minimal G is unique and the prior set C can be interpreted as the set of relevant measures. See Klibanoff et al. (2018) for a discussion of the connection between Bewley style sets and relevant measures.
A similar line of arguments applies. Outside of the prior set, it follows by monotonicity of G that it is optimal to choose x * = 1 and x * = 0 respectively. Thus, mixing implies that 1−q is an element of the prior set. Further, an increasing utility difference u ∆ for bounded G functions is equivalent to increasing ambiguity aversion for constant utility difference. The mixing interval converges to C, as a maximally ambiguity averse index is represented by maxmin preferences.
B Ambiguous beliefs over real-valued variables
Consider the task of eliciting beliefs about a real-valued variable Y : Ω → R. Formally, the state space is given by S = R × [0, 1]. The agent's preferences are defined on acts l : S → X that assign a monetary payoff to each state s ∈ S. Preferences over acts l are represented by a utility function U (l).
Let us begin with a precise definition of ambiguous beliefs. Let P denote a set of distributions over the real line.
Definition 5 (belief set). The belief set P 0 is defined as the set of relevant probabilities. The belief set for SEU preferences is simply the subjective probability distribution of Y . Other preferences, like maxmin preferences cannot be represented without taking into account the expected utility of a decision with respect to multiple probability measures. Such beliefs are called ambiguous.
Definition 6 (ambiguous beliefs). Beliefs about the random variable Y are called ambiguous if the belief reduces to a unique probability measure.
The agent is confronted with mixing bets for a series of events E i ⊂ R. Let [a i , b i ] denote the bounds elicited for event E i . Let us denote the set of probability distributions that is consistent with the obtained bounds as
It follows that P 0 ⊂ P * . Consider as example the situation where the random variable Y is assumed to be bounded by c, C ∈ R with c ≤ Y ≤ C P-almost surely for every P ∈ P 0 . If mixing bets are applied to the events E i = {ω ∈ Ω|Y (ω) ≤ c i } for some constants c < c 1 < · · · < c k < C, any element of the belief set P 0 has a cdf that lies in the gray area in Figure 8 . While unambiguous beliefs can be determined to an arbitrary degree of accuracy by increasing the number of thresholds c i , the bounds on ambiguous beliefs are conservative without additional assumptions.
An ambiguous belief over a event E = {Y ≤ c} implies ambiguous beliefs about Y . The reverse is generally not true, as can be seen by constructing a simple example. However, if the beliefs about the random variable Y are ambiguous, there always exists a threshold c such that the agent holds ambiguous beliefs over E = {Y ≤ c}.
